Page 62 - Pure Life 30
P. 62
The Nature of Religious Language… M. Mousavi Karimi and H. Tehrani Haeri / (61
true in its totality. So, he [i]n a religious discourse
developed an alternative theory, we use such expressions
according to which “the meaning as… differently to the
of a word is its use in the way in which we use
language”. (Wittgenstein, 2001: 18) them in science”. (Ibid
Therefore, to understand 1967: 57)
the meaning of a word we
should look and see the Indeed, science and religion
variety of the uses of the have a different criterion of
word. (Wittgenstein, 2001: 2-3) meaning. (Ibid: 58)
To address the multiplicity and This means that religious
variety of uses, Wittgenstein propositions are not factually
introduced the concept of cognitive and cannot be
evaluated empirically. In other
“language-game”, (Wittgenstein,
2001: 4) emphasizing “the fact words, they are essentially
that the speaking of language self-referential, and there is
[i.e., language game] is part no way to evaluate them on
of an activity, or of a form of the basis of external facts.
life”. (Ibid: 10). This view, known as
Religious activity, like scientific “Wittgensteinian fideism”,
activity, is a form of life. (Nielsen, 1967) implies that
However, the point is that religion is mainly about
these forms of life are totally intelligibility and unintelligibility,
different, and hence the language rather than trueness or falseness.
game of science is completely Of course, this is a
different from the language controversial claim and some
game of religion: of Wittgenstein interpreters
would object strongly to this.