Page 64 - Pure Life 37
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Personal Identity in… Sh. Vahidi Mehrajardi et al (63
be underpinned by some kind Van Inwagen (1990), Olson (1997)
of physical continuity, for & Mackie (1999).
instance, and whether it requires Some try to combine these
a non-branching restriction. views, saying that we need
There is also disagreement both mental and physical
about what mental features continuity to survive, or that
need to be inherited; But most either would suffice without
philosophers writing on the other. (Nozick, 1981: Ch. 1;
personal identity since the Langford, 2014)
early 20th century have A different sort of proposal
endorsed some version of this narrativism, is that what it
view. Advocates of takes for us to persist has to
psychological-continuity views do with the stories we tell
include Shoemaker (1963), about ourselves. We understand
Parfit (1971), Nagel (1971), our lives in terms of narratives
Lewis (1983), Johnston (1987), about the momentous events
Hudson (2001), Noonan (2021), in our past and their influence
and Merricks (2022). on our later decisions and
The second answer is that character. These narratives
our persistence consists of can be identity-constituting.
some sort of brute physical The thought is not just that
relation. You are that past or they bear on our personal
future being that has your identity in the sense of the
body, or that is the same characterization question, what
biological organism as you sort of people we are in some
are or the like. It has nothing fundamental sense.
to do with psychological facts. Narrativists about persistence
Call these brute-physical views. include Schechtman and Schroer
Their advocates include & Schroer (Ref: Schechtman,
Carter (1989), Ayers (1990), 1996, Ch. 5; Schroer & Schroer,
2014); Also, critics include
